Background Music Stints Creativity: Evidence from Compound Remote Associate Tasks by Threadgold, Emma et al.
Article
Background Music Stints Creativity: Evidence from 
Compound Remote Associate Tasks
Threadgold, Emma, Marsh, John Everett, McLatchie, Neil and Ball, 
Linden
Available at http://clok.uclan.ac.uk/25989/
Threadgold, Emma ORCID: 0000­0002­9073­0669, Marsh, John Everett ORCID: 0000­0002­
9494­1287, McLatchie, Neil and Ball, Linden ORCID: 0000­0002­5099­0124 (2019) Background 
Music Stints Creativity: Evidence from Compound Remote Associate Tasks. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology . ISSN 0888­4080  
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the work.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/acp.3532
For more information about UCLan’s research in this area go to 
http://www.uclan.ac.uk/researchgroups/ and search for <name of research Group>.
For information about Research generally at UCLan please go to 
http://www.uclan.ac.uk/research/ 
All outputs in CLoK are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, including
Copyright law.  Copyright, IPR and Moral Rights for the works on this site are retained 
by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Terms and conditions for use 
of this material are defined in the http://clok.uclan.ac.uk/policies/
CLoK
Central Lancashire online Knowledge
www.clok.uclan.ac.uk
Received: 4 April 2017 Revised: 23 December 2018 Accepted: 29 January 2019
DOI: 10.1002/acp.3532R E S E A R CH AR T I C L EBackground music stints creativity: Evidence from compound
remote associate tasksEmma Threadgold1* | John E. Marsh1,2* | Neil McLatchie3 | Linden J. Ball11School of Psychology, University of Central
Lancashire, Preston, UK
2Department of Building, Energy and
Environmental Engineering, University of
Gävle, Gävle, Sweden
3Department of Psychology, Lancaster
University, Lancaster, UK
Correspondence
Emma Threadgold, School of Psychology,
Darwin Building, University of Central
Lancashire, Preston, Lancashire PR1 2HE, UK.
Email: ethreadgold1@uclan.ac.uk
Funding information
British Academy and LeverhulmeTrust, Grant/
Award Number: SG162930- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
This is an open access article under the terms of th
the original work is properly cited.
© 2019 The Authors Applied Cognitive Psycholog
*Emma Threadgold and John E. Marsh contributed
Appl Cognit Psychol. 2019;1–16.Summary
Background music has been claimed to enhance people's creativity. In three experi-
ments, we investigated the impact of background music on performance of Com-
pound Remote Associate Tasks (CRATs), which are widely thought to tap creativity.
Background music with foreign (unfamiliar) lyrics (Experiment 1), instrumental music
without lyrics (Experiment 2), and music with familiar lyrics (Experiment 3) all signifi-
cantly impaired CRAT performance in comparison with quiet background conditions.
Furthermore, Experiment 3 demonstrated that background music impaired CRAT per-
formance regardless of whether the music induced a positive mood or whether partic-
ipants typically studied in the presence of music. The findings challenge the view that
background music enhances creativity and are discussed in terms of an auditory dis-
traction account (interference‐by‐process) and the processing disfluency account.
KEYWORDS
Compound Remote Associate Tasks, creativity, distraction, insight, musicCreativity is a vital aspect of cognition underpinning activities such as
innovative product design, scientific advancement, and effective
advertising and marketing communications. Background music is an
environmental stimulus known to influence cognitive performance,
which has also been claimed to enhance people's creativity for tasks
involving spatial abilities such as drawing (see Schellenberg, Nakata,
Hunter, & Tamoto, 2007). We argue, however, that there is limited
empirical support for the claimed benefits of background music on
creativity, with to our knowledge only one other study (i.e., Ritter &
Ferguson, 2017) demonstrating a facilitatory effect on creativity of
background music that participants were free to attend to for a task
that involved participants listing novel, alternative uses for a common
object (i.e., a brick). Another reason to be cautious regarding the
notion that background music can enhance performance on tasks tap-
ping creative cognition is the presence of a substantial research base- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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equally to this study.demonstrating that to‐be‐ignored background sound impairs task per-
formance (Beaman, 2005; Hughes & Jones, 2003).
In the present paper, we critically examine the claim that back-
ground music enhances creativity by employing variants of widely used
verbal problem solving tasks that are typically used to study creativity
(Ansburg, 2000; Fodor, 1999; Mednick & Mednick, 1967; Mehta, Zhu,
& Cheema, 2012; Mikulincer & Sheffi, 2000; Storm, Angello, & Bjork,
2011) being indexed by, and solved via, a process of insight: Compound
RemoteAssociateTasks (CRATs; e.g., see Bowden, Jung‐Beeman, Fleck,
& Kounios, 2005; see below for further explanation). We contrast two
competing accounts of the impact of background music on creative
problem solving: (a) the processing disfluency account (Mehta et al.,
2012), in which background music potentially enhances creativity by
engendering processing disfluency and thence increased task engage-
ment; and (b) the auditory distraction (interference‐by‐process) account
(e.g., Jones& Tremblay, 2000;Marsh, Hughes, & Jones, 2009; Perham&
Vizard, 2010), which assumes that the presence of any type of auditory- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
cense, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided
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2 THREADGOLD ET AL.distractor sequence will disrupt cognitive task performance providing it
demonstrates changing‐state characteristics. That is, auditory sequences
in which a series of elements differ from one element to the next (such as
tones, syllables, and words) in terms of frequency/pitch/timbre are more
disruptive than a series within which the same element is repeated such
as the same tone, syllable, or word. It has been shown, for example, that
the latter, steady‐state stimuli typically fail to disrupt short‐termmemory
performance (e.g., Jones &Macken, 1993). It is worth noting here that in
addition to this “acoustic interference‐by‐process,” an interference‐by‐
process can also operate at a semantic level due to a clash between
two concurrent semantic processes: a deliberate one applied to the
to‐be‐remembered material and one applied automatically to the to‐
be‐ignored auditory material (Marsh et al., 2009; Marsh, Hughes, &
Jones, 2008). The focus of the current paper, however, is on the
acoustic interference‐by‐process (e.g., Jones & Tremblay, 2000).
Prior to considering the relationship between background music
and creative problem solving performance, it is useful to note that
researchers have traditionally made a key distinction between two
types of creative thinking, that is, divergent thinking versus conver-
gent thinking (Guilford, 1967). Divergent thinking refers to a strategy
whereby multiple creative ideas are produced and appraised within a
short period of time in order to generate potential solutions for a
given problem. A typical task involving divergent thinking is the Alter-
native UsesTask, wherein participants are required to think of as many
uses as possible for a simple, everyday object such as a brick or
paperclip (cf. the aforementioned study of music and creativity by
Ritter & Ferguson, 2017). Convergent thinking, on the other hand,
permits the connection of different ideas to determine a single, correct
solution to a problem. Importantly, tasks involving creative convergent
thinking—including the CRATs that we employed in the present study,
as discussed below—may do so on the basis of associations and poten-
tial solutions generated through divergent thought.
It is additionally important to note that creative problem solving,
whether underpinned by divergent or convergent thinking, is often
characterised by the ability to perceive a problem space in new ways
by discovering hidden patterns or by connecting seemingly unrelated
ideas (e.g., Ohlsson, 2011). One key way in which creative problem
solving comes about is by means of so‐called insight, with tasks involving
creative thinking typically being solved via insight processes. Accounts of
insight in problem solving such as the “special‐process theory” (e.g., Ball &
Stevens, 2009; Bowden et al., 2005) argue that problems that tend to be
solved via an insight process call upon very different processing
mechanisms to “noninsight” problems. For example, Jung‐Beeman et al.
(2004) identified neural patterns just prior to the emergence of insight
that demonstrate a hemispheric shift in processing occurring at this point.
Jung‐Beeman et al. (2004) propose that during insight problem solving
loose associative processing occurring nonconsciously in the right
temporal lobe takes precedence over finer‐grained processing in the left
hemisphere, implying that neural areas linked with diffuse associative
processing are critical for the emergence of creative insight (for a recent
review of related findings, see Shen, Yuan, Liu, & Luo, 2017).
Several researchers suppose that an insight sequence defines crea-
tive thinking and that any advance in thought that is not characterisedby such a sequence is therefore not creative (e.g., Ohlsson, 2011; Perkins,
2000; Wiley & Jarosz, 2012; but see Weisberg, 2015). This unique
sequence of events that defines insight in problem solving comprises:
presentation of the problem, repeated failure, impasse, restructuring,
and an “Aha!” experience that is associated with solution generation.
According to this sequence of events, failed attempts to solve a problem
can lead to an impasse, whereby the participant, after several unsuccess-
ful attempts at solving the problem, feels they are unable to move
forward to reach a solution. After a period of failing to make progress,
an abandoning of the original problem structure occurs and a new
representation of the problem is formed through restructuring, which
may itself be based on processes such as spreading activation in associa-
tive networks (see Shen et al., 2017). Such problem restructuring may
then lead to the emergence of a solution. Crucially, problems that are
typically solved by insight often cannot readily be solved via routine
search processes. This is because the starting conditions, goals, and
possible sequences of actions are ambiguous (i.e., a heuristic‐type search
within the original problem representation will not yield a solution).
As we have noted, our present research used CRATs as a measure
of insight‐based creative problem solving (Bowden & Jung‐Beeman,
1998). A CRAT involves a participant being shown three words (e.g.,
dress, dial, and flower), with the requirement being to find a single asso-
ciated word (in this case “sun”) that can be combined with each pre-
sented word (either being placed before it or after it) to make a
common word or phrase (i.e., sundress, sundial, and sunflower in the
present example). CRATs are variants of problems referred to as
Remote Associate Tasks (RATs; see Mednick, 1962; Mednick &
Mednick, 1967), for which the solution can be associated with each of
the provided three words in different ways. For example, a RAT (e.g.,
same, tennis, and head), in contrast to a CRAT, can be solved by means
of semantic association (tennis match), synonymy (same = match) and,
as with CRATs, the formation of compound words (matchhead).
Nowadays, both RATs and CRATs are commonly used tests of
creativity within psychology and cognitive neuroscience. They have been
employed, for example, to examine creativity in relation to sleep (e.g., Cai,
Mednick, Harrison, Kanady, &Mednick, 2009), memory (e.g., Storm et al.,
2011), attention (e.g., Ansburg & Hill, 2003), and attentional deficit
hyperactivity disorder (e.g., White & Shah, 2011), and they have
additionally been employed in neuroimaging studies of creativity (e.g.,
Arden, Chavez, Grazioplene, & Jung, 2010). According to Bowden and
Jung‐Beeman (2003), the popularity of these problems resides in the fact
that they have an unambiguous, single‐word answer, and that multiple
items can be solved in a single session. Furthermore, RATs and CRATs
are less complex than classic insight problems such as the candle problem
or two‐string problem (see Weisberg, 1995), such that they are less
susceptible to confounding of variables. These characteristics made
these problems very appealing for the current investigation.
Problem solving performance on RATs andCRATs has been found to
correlate with performance on other creative tasks such as rebus puzzles
(MacGregor & Cunningham, 2008; seeThreadgold, Marsh, & Ball, 2018,
for further discussion) and classic insight tasks (Schooler & Melcher,
1995; but see Webb, Little, Cropper, & Ruze, 2017). Such patterns of
association suggest that RATs and CRATs represent effective tests of
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component processes critical for, and the same phenomenological
experience of, insight solutions to more complex problems” (Bowden &
Jung‐Beeman, 2003, p. 634; see also Bowden & Jung‐Beeman, 2007).
For example, the problems initially misdirect or fail to direct retrieval
processes, thereby leading to an impasse. In addition, solvers often report
an “Aha!” experience on task completion. As well as being characterised
by the insight sequence, RATs and CRATs also appear to be underpinned
by a range of other processes, including unconscious spreading activation
in associative networks (Smith, Huber, & Vul, 2013), conscious verbal
processes such as subvocal rehearsal (Ball & Stevens, 2009), and
executive processes such as those that inhibit incorrect solution ideas
and enable the active manipulation of information in working memory
(Chein & Weisberg, 2014; Storm & Angello, 2010).
Although there is a paucity of research examining the effects of
background music on creativity, there is a small literature on the
impact of noise on creative cognition, with this research having typi-
cally used RATs, but occasionally other creative tasks too (Hillier, Alex-
ander, & Beversdorf, 2006; Kasof, 1997; Martindale & Greenough,
1973; Mehta et al., 2012). For example, aperiodic noise such as white
noise and pink noise has been shown to affect creativity, as measured
using RATs. For example, Martindale and Greenough (1973; 75 dB)
and Hillier et al. (2006; 90 dB) showed that a high intensity white
noise, compared with a no noise control condition, impaired task per-
formance. Moreover, Kasof (1997) reported that a high level
(85 dB[A]) of intermittent, compared with continuous, pink noise
reduced creativity as measured with a poetry writing task. In contrast,
Toplyn and Maguire (1991) found that highly creative participants (as
gauged by their performance on RATs) demonstrated greater creativ-
ity on other tasks when exposed to 80 dB white noise, compared with
when exposed to 60 or 100 dB white noise.
Mehta et al. (2012) used more naturalistic, ambient noises to
resemble restaurant noise, wherein distant construction noise,
multitalker babble, and roadside traffic were blended and reported
that a moderate level of noise (70 dB), as compared with low level
noise (50 dB), improved performance on creative tasks. These tasks
included RATs (Experiment 1), a task wherein participants generated
novel ideas for improving mattress comfort (Experiment 2), a task
requiring the generation of alternative uses for a brick (Experiment
3), and a task concerning how to clean scuffed shoes with no polish
(Experiment 4). Of relevance to the present study, participants gener-
ated more correct answers to RATs in the presence of moderate noise
compared with a low level of noise and a high level of noise (85 dB).
We note here, however, that in contrast with the RATs, the other
tasks used by Mehta et al. (2012) arguably make less demands on verbal
working memory. Indeed, these tasks tap divergent thinking in that they
require the production of multiple responses in a manner similar to
standard verbal fluency tasks. Verbal fluency tasks require the produc-
tion of numerous responses given a phonemic (produce words beginning
with the letter “F”) or semantic (produce as many examples of “Fruit”) cue
within a time limit (Jones, Marsh, & Hughes, 2012; Marsh, Crawford,
Pilgrim, Sörqvist, & Hughes, 2017). Although some aspects of the task,
such as the requirement to maintain memory for previously producedresponses to avoid repetition tap verbal working memory, these tasks
are not characterised by continuous generation and testing of word
combinations andmaintenance of intermediate solutions that distinguish
the convergent thinking underpinning the RAT. Indeed, perhaps it is no
surprise that tasks that tap divergent thinking such as category fluency
tend to be immune to disruption produced by changing‐state background
sound, unless it conveys semantic content (Jones et al., 2012). In this
respect, our focus was on the variant of the RAT (i.e., the CRAT), since
in contrast to divergent thinking tasks, CRATs should be more sensitive
to disruption produced by the changing‐state acoustic properties of
background sound.
An alternative account of the relationship between background
sound and creativity holds that benefits to cognitive task performance
can be observed through mood and arousal (for a review, see
Schellenberg, 2005). For example, Thompson, Schellenberg, and
Husain (2001) showed that performance on tests of spatial abilities
was improved when the tasks were executed after listening to music
rated as “liked” by participants, as opposed to being exposed to quiet.
Moreover, the improvement in performance was driven by changes in
arousal and mood produced by listening to the music. It is important to
note that mood and arousal are not the same construct. For example,
mood can be decreased and arousal can be increased when music is
disliked. It is possible that the effects of music on cognitive task per-
formance are driven by changes to both mood and arousal, with
increases in both leading to enhanced performance.
A recent study by Ritter and Ferguson (2017) required participants
to undertake tasks involving creative cognition while concurrently
listening to music or exposure to quiet. In a between‐participants design,
Ritter and Ferguson showed that a beneficial effect of music on creative
task performancewas limited to a comparison between a silent condition
and a so‐called “happy music” condition (Vivaldi's “Four Seasons”). Expo-
sure to “calm music,” “sad music,” and “anxious music” had no impact on
creative task performance compared with quiet (but see Perham &
Withey, 2012, for evidence of enhanced spatial rotation performance
following listening to slow‐tempo, sad music of a participant's own
choosing compared with a slow‐tempo control excerpt). In line with the
notion that changes to mood and arousal may collectively enhance crea-
tive task performance, participants in Ritter and Ferguson's (2017) study
assigned more positive mood and higher arousal to the happy music con-
dition in comparison with the other conditions. Therefore, the benefit to
creative task performance could have been driven by increases in mood
and arousal rather than the presence of the music per se.
Although the notion that increases in both mood and arousal can
benefit creativity has some appeal, we note that Ritter and Ferguson
(2017) did not report statistical comparisons between all of the music
conditions in their between‐participants design, which potentially
undermines their conclusions. Furthermore, Mehta et al. (2012) pro-
pose that arousal‐based explanations of the impact of to‐be‐ignored
noise on creativity are insufficient because over a longer period of
exposure to the sound, physiological arousal levels should normalise
and cease to have a consistent influence. Thus, Mehta et al. argue that
arousal is not the key contributing factor to the impact of to‐be‐
ignored noise on creativity. They instead propose that moderate noise
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increasing construal levels, thereby promoting more abstract thinking.
More specifically, when construal levels are high, then individuals will
engage in abstract thought to consider the “bigger picture” rather than
focus on specific details (e.g., see Burgoon, Henderson, & Markman,
2013). Such high‐level construal involves a focus on the commonality
and central features of a situation such that its overall gist can be
extracted. In contrast, the overall gist of a situation is less likely to
be extracted when construal levels are low because people focus on
peripheral (or secondary) features. In support of the influence of
high‐level construal on creativity, research has demonstrated that per-
formance on a wide range of creativity tasks can benefit from the
experimental induction of abstract levels of thought (Friedman & Fӧr-
ster, 2002; Fӧrster, Friedman, & Liberman, 2004).
The processing disfluency account has its conceptual basis within
research on metacognition, which focuses on processes that monitor
and control cognition (Ackerman & Thompson, 2017a,b). Such
metacognitive processes are involved in people's subjective judge-
ments of how well a current task is being, could be, or has been per-
formed. Metacognitive control processes about one's current task can
be applied to initiate, terminate, or change the allocation of time, effort,
and cognitive resources to the task (Ackerman & Thompson, 2017a).
One of a variety of cues on which metacognitive monitoring is based
is the subjective ease of processing (fluent vs. disfluent; easy vs. diffi-
cult) that derives from one's own experience at attempting the task.
Subjective experiences of task difficulty can catalyse a shift in process-
ing and engender increased task engagement (e.g., Alter, Oppenheimer,
Epley, & Eyre, 2007; Rummer, Schweppe, & Schwede, 2016).
Attempts to comprehend metacognitive modulation of thought
have typically evoked dual‐process theories, which posit the exis-
tence of two qualitatively distinct types of thinking: Types 1 and 2
processes (Evans & Stanovich, 2013a,b). Type 1 processes are auton-
omous and undemanding of working memory (a concept used in ways
that links to notions of executive and attentional control) and tend to
be fast, nonconscious, intuitive, and associative. On the other hand,
Type 2 processes rely on working memory (including executive and
attentional control) and are focused on cognitive decoupling and
mental simulation, critical for hypothetical thinking. Type 2 processes
also tend to be slow, conscious, analytic, and deliberative. Type 2 pro-
cesses can be activated if the monitoring system—as part of the
metacognitive architecture—judges that a task is difficult (e.g., Bjork,
Dunlosky, & Kornell, 2013; see also Thompson, 2010). Mehta et al.
(2012) argue that the presence of noise creates processing disfluency
and supports a processing shift inducing higher construal levels and
more abstract thinking that is presumably linked to more diffuse asso-
ciative processing of the type that is known to arise in creative
insight. For example, in the case of CRATs, diffuse associative pro-
cessing could cause spreading semantic activation within a network
of associates yielding convergent activation on the word that the
three seemingly unrelated words have in common, thereby yielding
the solution (see Bowden & Beeman, 1998; Shen et al., 2017).
That background sound can improve performance on creative tasks
contrasts with a large literature relating to distraction of human cognitionthrough exposure to noise (for reviews, see Beaman, 2005; Hughes &
Jones, 2003). The task typically used to illustrate the vulnerability of
cognition to disruption by the mere presence of to‐be‐ignored back-
ground sound is short‐term visual–verbal serial recall (Colle & Welsh,
1976; Jones & Macken, 1993; Salamé & Baddeley, 1982). This task
involves the visual presentation of verbal items (e.g., seven or eight
letters or digits) with the requirement to recall these items according to
the serial order in which theywere presented. Initial work suggested that
this disruption arose because the sound was composed of speech.
However, the semantic properties of speech were found to be impotent
in their capacity to disrupt serial recall: speech presented in a language
understood by the participant produces no more disruption than that
produced in a language incomprehensible to the participant (Jones,Miles,
& Page, 1990). Thus, semantic properties of the to‐be‐ignored
background sound were irrelevant to the level of disruption caused.
Similarly, the notion that the disruption by background sound arose
due to a confusion between phonemes derived from the visual items
(via their covert articulation) that gain direct (spoken items) and indirect
(visual items) access into a phonological store (Salamé & Baddeley,
1982) was undermined by findings that serial recall was shown to be
susceptible to disruption by the presence of background music without
lyrics, and therefore phonemes (Klatte, Kilcher, & Hellbrück, 1995; Klatte,
Lachmann, Schlittmeier, & Hellbrück, 2010; Nittono, 1997; Salamé &
Baddeley, 1989; Schlittmeier, Hellbrück, & Klatte, 2008), and by the
presence of sequences of tones, provided they change from one
successive tone to the next (Divin, Coyle, & James, 2001; Elliott, 2002;
Jones & Macken, 1993).
The key empirical referent for this so‐called “irrelevant sound
effect” is the changing‐state effect. This concerns the finding that a
changing sequence of sounds, regardless of whether the changes
occur on a speech carrier (e.g., a sequence of different verbal tokens)
or a nonspeech carrier (e.g., a sequence of tones of different fre-
quency), disrupts serial recall to a far greater extent than a
nonchanging or steady‐state sound (e.g., a repeated token or tone;
Jones & Macken, 1993; Jones, Madden, & Miles, 1992). According
to the interference‐by‐process approach (e.g., Jones & Tremblay,
2000), the pre‐attentive processing of the order of changes within
sound impairs the deliberate serial rehearsal process that supports
the ordered recall of to‐be‐remembered items.
Given that the solving of CRATs appears to be underpinned by
verbal processes such as subvocal rehearsal (Ball & Stevens, 2009) in
addition to executive processes (Chein & Weisberg, 2014) and spread-
ing activation in associative networks (Smith et al., 2013), we expect
CRATs to be susceptible to disruption by the presence of to‐be‐
ignored background music. Our rationale behind suggesting that ver-
bal processing of CRATs will be susceptible to changing‐state distrac-
tion is supported by the findings that impairment of CRAT
performance through concurrent articulatory suppression is observed
within this procedure, whereas facilitation of CRAT performance
occurs via encouraging verbalisation through the “think aloud” tech-
nique (Ball & Stevens, 2009). Thus, the availability of speech (inner
speech or external speech) is necessary for efficient CRAT problem
solving performance. In the context of serial recall, the skill of speech
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tive medium for retaining visual–verbal items due to its inherent
sequentiality, continuity, and prosodic and co‐articulatory nature.
Inner speech therefore enables the grafting of serial order constraints
onto the presented list; the act of covertly co‐articulating to‐be‐
remembered items generates sequential information and constraints
that do not occur within the list itself. However, this motoric based
serial rehearsal process is subject to interference from the automatic,
pre‐attentive processing of the serial order of changes in a background
auditory sequence (such as music).
In our recent work, it is becoming clearer that tasks that may not
necessarily involve serial rehearsal, but that do involve the use of inner
speech for effective task performance (e.g., face recognition; Marsh
et al., 2018) are also vulnerable to the changing‐state effect. Of
course, speech (inner or outer) involves planning of sequential motor
acts, which may render it vulnerable to disruption via changing‐state
speech in many settings. In the context of CRATs, inner (and outer)
speech clearly supports effective performance (Ball & Stevens,
2009). It may even be that participants use serial rehearsal to test
out novel solutions.
We do not claim that CRAT performance is underpinned entirely
by verbal maintenance processes. Rather, it is clear that spreading
semantic activation processes (Smith et al., 2013), and executive pro-
cesses that are involved in generating response candidates and
inhibiting misleading/incorrect solutions (Storm & Angello, 2010) are
also central to the production of responses. That said, it is often
not clear which component of a multicomponent task is associated
with CRAT performance. For example, the finding of an association
between Working Memory Capacity measures and CRAT perfor-
mance (Chein & Weisberg, 2014) could be due to the role of
attentional/cognitive control (which may involve executive control
processes such as inhibition) or the requirement to retain serial order
information: Working Memory Capacity tasks involve combining the
short‐term storage of visual/verbal items with a concurrent process-
ing task. Therefore, we hold that subvocal maintenance processes
involving inner speech can underpin solution of CRATs and that this
process is susceptible to disruption via processing of a changing‐state
auditory sequence. The aim of the series of three experiments that
we present here was to investigate the impact of to‐be‐ignored back-
ground sound (i.e., music with foreign, [unfamiliar] lyrics; instrumental
music; and music with familiar lyrics) on tasks believed to measure
creativity, that is, CRATs.1 | EXPERIMENT 1
The aim of Experiment 1 was to establish if music with unfamiliar
lyrics facilitates creativity as measured via performance with CRATs
through engendering processing disfluency (Mehta et al., 2012), or
impairs creativity, possibly due to the disruption of verbal processes
such as subvocal rehearsal (Ball & Stevens, 2009) due to its
changing‐state characteristics. To investigate these two competing
accounts and opposing predictions, we contrasted performance in aquiet condition to a condition with to‐be‐ignored background music
with clearly discernible lyrics in a foreign language that were unfamil-
iar to the participants (i.e., the musical excerpt contained Spanish lyrics
presented to native English speakers; thus, the lyrics were both unfa-
miliar and meaningless to the participants, who were unable to process
their semantic content). As such, any observed disruption could not be
viewed as being attributable to interference between the semantic
properties of the to‐be‐ignored sound and the semantic processes
underpinning the solving of CRATs (see Marsh et al., 2008, 2009). If
unfamiliar music engenders processing disfluency (cf. Mehta et al.,
2012), then one should observe better performance when music, as
compared with quiet, accompanies problem solving. However, if ver-
bal processes underpinning CRAT performance are susceptible to dis-
ruption via changing‐state irrelevant sound—as the interference‐by‐
process account would assume (Jones & Tremblay, 2000)—then per-
formance should be poorer in the presence of music as compared with
quiet.1.1 | Method
1.1.1 | Participants
Thirty adults (15 female and 15 male) from the University of Central
Lancashire participated in the experiment (M = 22 years, SD = 2.78,
age range 19 to 30 years old). The participants were recruited via an
opportunity sample. Participants received course credit or the stan-
dard department payment rate in exchange for 30 min of participation
time. All participants spoke English as their first language and reported
normal (or corrected‐to‐normal) vision and hearing. The experiment
received Ethical Clearance from the University of Central Lancashire.
1.1.2 | Design and materials
The design was a fully within‐participants 2 × 2 design with Sound
(Quiet vs. Spanish Music) and CRAT Difficulty (Easy vs. Difficult) as
the factors. A set of 38 CRATs were selected from the problems
developed by Bowden and Jung‐Beeman (1998) using the program
“Match” (Van Casteren & Davis, 2007). Match automates the selection
of several groups of smaller stimuli sets from a larger pool ensuring the
groups are matched on multiple dimensions. Here, the sets of CRATs
were matched on solution accuracy and solution time data provided
by Bowden and Jung‐Beeman (1998). Each CRAT consisted of the
presentation of three single words, with the participant having to find
a word that combines with each of the three presented words to make
a common word or phrase. For example, if participants are presented
with the words stick/maker/point, then the word that links with each
of these is the word match to create the phrases or words matchstick,
match maker, and match point. Therefore, the answer or target in this
instance would be the word “match.”
The 38 selected CRATs were divided into a set of 20 easy CRATs
(Easy CRATs' solution rates: M = 68.9%, SD = 16.2, Easy CRATs' solu-
tion times: M = 8.23 s, SD = 2.61) and 18 difficult CRATs (Difficult
CRATs' solution rates: M = 26.6%, SD = 14.3, Difficult CRATs' solution
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divided into two equal matched sets (Set A solution rates:
M = 49.4%, SD = 26.1, solution times: M = 9.98 s, SD = 3.6 vs. Set B
solution rates: M = 48%, SD = 27, solution times: M = 10.1 s, SD = 3.3)
as indexed by normative data on solution rate and solution time data
for 30‐s presentation time provided by Bowden and Jung‐Beeman
(1998). It is typical to divide CRAT sets into easy and difficult (Ball &
Stevens, 2009). Difficult, but not easy, problems can benefit from
overt verbalisation, whereas preventing subvocalisation via requiring
participants to suppress articulation while problem solving can hinder
performance with both easy and difficult problems (Ball & Stevens,
2009). Although not a primary goal of the study, we nevertheless con-
sidered it important to investigate the potential differential suscepti-
bility to distraction of easy and difficult problems. The experiment
was fully counterbalanced such that each CRAT set appeared within
each sound condition.
1.1.3 | Procedure
Participants read an information sheet and completed a consent form
prior to taking part in the experiment. Participants were given instruc-
tions for the CRATs that explained the need to find one target word
per problem, that, when combined with the three presented words
(either before or after the presented words), created a common word
or phrase. Prior to the test problems, participants were asked to tackle
five practice problems to ensure familiarity with the task. These practice
problems were also selected from Bowden and Jung‐Beeman (1998).
Participants were allocated 30 s per CRAT item. All three problem
words were presented simultaneously along the same horizontal plane.
The music was played via Sennheiser HD‐202 headphones at
approximately 65–70 dB(A). The music was a 30‐s segment of a Span-
ish translation of a 1990s UK chart pop song played via E‐Prime Soft-
ware that contained clearly discernable lyrics and accompanying
instruments. The music contains appreciable acoustic variation and
satisfied the criterion for being a changing‐state stimulus. In the sound
condition, this music segment accompanied each CRAT problem,
starting with the onset of the problem and ending once the participant
indicated they had solved the CRAT by pressing the spacebar. After
participants pressed the spacebar, a textbox appeared wherein partic-
ipants typed their answer. Participants were asked to complete the
CRATs while ignoring the background sound. They were also
reassured that they would not be asked anything about the back-
ground sound. Participants were fully debriefed at the end of the task
and thanked for their participation. During debriefing, participants
were presented with the auditory stimuli they were exposed to during
the experiment and asked if they were familiar with the song or had
heard it before in experiment; none replied that they were or had.
1.2 | Results
The data for each of the three experiments can be found via the fol-
lowing link: https://osf.io/j6hwd/. The basic data pattern for the pres-
ent experiment indicated that CRAT solution rates were higher in thequiet condition in comparison with the music condition. Furthermore,
a greater number of easy CRATs were solved in comparison with dif-
ficult CRATs. To examine the data further, a 2 (Sound: Quiet vs. Span-
ish Music) × 2 (CRAT Difficulty: Easy vs. Difficult) within‐participants
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on mean solution rates
(i.e., proportion correct). An alpha level of p < 0.05 was adopted for
all statistical tests. There was a significant main effect of Sound,
F (1, 29) = 9.91, MSE = 0.01, p = 0.004, ηp
2 = 0.25. Significantly more
CRATs were solved in the quiet condition (M = 0.43, SE = 0.04) in
comparison with the Spanish music condition (M = 0.36, SE = 0.05).
There was a main effect of CRAT Difficulty, F (1, 29) = 63.36,
MSE = 0.02, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.67, with significantly higher solution
rates for the easy CRATs (M = 0.49, SE = 0.04) in comparison with
the difficult CRATs (M = 0.29, SE = 0.05). There was no significant
Sound × CRAT Difficulty interaction, F (1, 29) = 1.36, MSE = 0.02,
p = 0.25, ηp
2 = 0.05.1.3 | Discussion
The aim of Experiment 1 was to compare CRAT performance in a
quiet condition to performance when ignoring background music with
unfamiliar foreign lyrics. Significantly more CRATs were solved in the
quiet condition relative to the background music condition. As antici-
pated, there was a significant difference in solution rates for the easy
versus the difficult CRATs. Furthermore, there was no significant
interaction between Sound and CRAT Difficulty for solution rates.
That Sound impaired CRAT performance regardless of problem diffi-
culty coheres with the findings of Ball and Stevens (2009), who dem-
onstrated that articulatory suppression similarly impaired performance
with easy and difficult tasks. However, the results are inconsistent
with the general view that music enhances creativity, and dispute
the prediction that background noise enhances creativity due to the
promotion of processing disfluency and subsequent encouragement
of abstract thought (Mehta et al., 2012). That CRAT performance
was disrupted by the presence of a stimulus that conveyed no mean-
ing to the participants precludes a semantic interference‐by‐process
explanation of the results (cf. Marsh et al., 2008, 2009). However,
the results are consistent with previous findings, which demonstrate
background sounds that are meaningless to participants, can impair
performance of tasks that require verbal working memory compo-
nents such as serial recall, providing they possess appreciable
changing‐state properties (e.g., Jones et al., 1990): an acoustic
interference‐by‐process (Jones & Tremblay, 2000).2 | EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 1 identified that music with foreign (unfamiliar) lyrics had a
detrimental effect on the solution rates of CRATs in comparison with a
quiet condition. At first glance, this finding is at odds with the notion
that creative performance can be enhanced in the presence of back-
ground sound, through encouraging processing disfluency and pro-
moting the abstract thought believed to be required to solve CRATs.
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performance with ambient sound comprising “multi‐talker noise in a
cafeteria, roadside traffic, and distant construction noise to create a
soundtrack of constantly varying background noise” (p. 786), whereas
the current study used Spanish music with a clearly discernible voice
(although in a language foreign to the participant, thereby conveying
unfamiliar lyrics). We note that the presence of a clearly discernible
voice could be a key difference between our study and that of Mehta
et al. (2012) in driving the direction of the effect of background sound
on creative performance. One possibility is that the presence of dis-
cernible speech in Experiment 1 could somehow prevent participants
from achieving the disfluent processing state that could facilitate
CRAT performance through abstract thought.
To address this aforementioned issue, Experiment 2 compared a
quiet background with music without speech (lyrics) to investigate
whether the presence of speech in some way impedes disfluent pro-
cessing and thus prevents any supposed benefits of such disfluent pro-
cessing on CRAT performance. In terms of the contrasting view that
background sound can impair creative processing through impairing
verbal working memory, music without lyrics should impair CRAT per-
formance similarly to Spanish music with a discernible voice. In support
of this view, numerous studies in the context of serial‐verbal short‐term
memory (Klatte et al., 1995; Klatte et al., 2010; Nittono, 1997; Salamé&
Baddeley, 1989; Schlittmeier et al., 2008) have shown that the pres-
ence of speech is not a prerequisite to produce disruption of verbal
working memory. Thus, on the interference‐by‐process account, music
without lyrics (speech) would also be expected to disrupt the creative
processes necessary for solving CRATs and Experiment 2 sought to
determine whether this was indeed the case.2.1 | Method
2.1.1 | Participants
Eighteen adults (12 female and six male) from the University of Cen-
tral Lancashire aged between 19 and 45 years old participated in the
experiment (M = 25 years, SD = 9.31). The participants were recruited
via an opportunity sample and received course credit, or the standard
department payment rate in exchange for 30 min of participation. All
participants spoke English as their first language and reported normal
(or corrected‐to‐normal) vision and normal hearing. The experiment
received Ethical Clearance from the University of Central Lancashire.2.1.2 | Design and materials
The design and materials were identical to those outlined in Experi-
ment 1 above, with the exception of a manipulation to one of the
levels of the within‐participant factors, Sound, which had two levels:
Quiet vs. Music without Lyrics. The sound used within Experiment 2
was therefore the same as that used in Experiment 1, but without
the lyrical content.2.1.3 | Procedure
Each participant read an information sheet and signed a consent form
prior to beginning the experiment. The procedure remained identical
to that reported in Experiment 1 outlined above. All participants were
fully debriefed at the end of the experiment. As with Experiment 1, at
debriefing, participants were presented with the auditory stimuli they
were exposed to during the experiment and asked if they were familiar
with the song or had heard it before the experiment. None of the par-
ticipants reported familiarity with the song, nor hearing it previously.2.2 | Results
The pattern of results in the present experiment replicated that found
in Experiment 1. CRAT solutions were higher in the quiet condition in
comparison with the music condition. Furthermore, a greater number
of easy CRATs were solved in comparison with difficult CRATs. A 2
(Sound: Quiet vs. Music without Lyrics) × 2 (CRAT Difficulty: Easy
vs. Difficult) within‐participants ANOVA was conducted on the
dependent variable of mean solution rate. An alpha level of p < 0.05
was adopted for all statistical tests. There was a significant main effect
of Sound, F (1, 17) = 8.60, MSE = 0.02, p = 0.009, ηp
2 = 0.34. Signifi-
cantly more CRATs were solved in the Quiet condition (M = 0.39,
SE = 0.04) in comparison with the Music without Lyrics condition
(M = 0.29, SE = 0.03). There was a main effect of CRAT Difficulty,
F (1, 17) = 61.05, MSE = 0.03, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.78, with significantly
higher solution rates for the easy CRATs (M = 0.48, SE = 0.05) in com-
parison with the difficult CRATs (M = 0.19, SE = 0.03). There was no
significant Sound × CRAT Difficulty interaction, F (1, 17) = 2.51,
MSE = 0.02, p = 0.13, ηp
2 = 0.13.2.3 | Discussion
The aim of Experiment 2 was to compare CRAT performance in a
quiet condition versus performance with to‐be‐ignored background
music without lyrics. This was to investigate whether the presence
of speech in Experiment 1 produced disruption of CRAT performance,
and if this effect would hold for music without any speech content (in
other words, music without lyrics). Experiment 2 supported the find-
ings of Experiment 1 in that significantly more CRATs were solved in
the quiet condition in comparison with the music without lyrics condi-
tion. Consistent with Experiment 1, there was a significant difference
in solution rates for the easy versus the difficult CRATs. Furthermore,
there was no significant interaction between Sound and CRAT Diffi-
culty for solution rates.
The results are again inconsistent with the general view that music
enhances creativity, and instead we demonstrate a deficit to CRAT per-
formance in the presence of to‐be‐ignored background music with
unfamiliar lyrics (Experiment 1) as well as in the absence of lyrics
(Experiment 2). Moreover, the results oppose the view that background
noise leads to processing disfluency, which in turn promotes creativity
by engendering increased abstract thought (Mehta et al., 2012). The
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CRAT performance via background music was due to the presence of
speech in Experiment 1. Here, we demonstrate in Experiment 2 that
music without lyrics (i.e., in the absence of any speech content) still
failed to produce a facilitation in creativity and in fact resulted in a dec-
rement in creativity in comparison with a quiet condition.
Taken together, the findings of Experiments 1 and 2 support the
notion that verbal working memory is necessary for CRAT perfor-
mance (Ball & Stevens, 2009), and that this is susceptible to disruption
by the presence of to‐be‐ignored background sound, regardless of
whether this background sound is speech or nonspeech based (e.g.,
Jones & Macken, 1993).3 | EXPERIMENT 3
As we have discussed in our introduction, both the interference‐by‐
process view (Jones & Tremblay, 2000) and the processing disfluency
view (Mehta et al., 2012) eschew the role of mood and arousal in
mediating the effect of background sound on creative task perfor-
mance. However, there is a compelling literature showing that
increased mood and arousal that derives from listening to music may
affect cognitive task performance. For example, Thompson et al.
(2001) demonstrated a benefit to subsequent visuo‐spatial task per-
formance from prior listening to music as compared with exposure
to quiet that was entirely dependent on the change in mood and
arousal that the music produced. Furthermore, Ritter and Ferguson
(2017) reported that music presented 15 s prior to, and concurrently
with, the performance of a task that involved creative verbal cognition
facilitated performance on that task. However, this facilitatory effect
occurred only for “happy” music that engendered positive affect and
increased arousal. The relationship between happy music and
increased arousal is usually attributed to the music's higher tempo
(Vieillard et al., 2008). Moreover, music that is rated as being “liked”
is typically “happy” music (Husain, Thompson, & Schellenberg, 2002).
Therefore, it remains possible that given the pleasure that individuals
usually derive from music, the music one choses to listen to might typ-
ically induce a positive mood and increased arousal, thereby yielding a
positive impact on task performance (Thompson et al., 2001), particu-
larly for tasks that involve creativity (Ritter & Ferguson, 2017). Indeed,
previous research has established that positive mood can improve per-
formance on RATs (Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007). In both Experi-
ments 1 and 2, our use of arbitrary music with foreign or
“unfamiliar” lyrics, and music with the absence of lyrics, could have
induced a neutral or even negative mood state in participants, which
might have hindered the emergence of creative insight.
To investigate any potential mediating impact of mood on CRAT
performance in Experiment 3, participants tackled CRAT problems in
the presence of music with positive lyrics and fast tempo (approxi-
mately 160 beats per minute), which we considered should increase
positive affect and arousal. Indeed, research has identified that happy
music typically has a tempo of around 150 beats per minute; thus, our
musical condition exceeds this figure (Khalfa, Roy, Rainville, DallaBella, & Peretz, 2008). Furthermore, “happy” music is known to
increase arousal (e.g., Salimpoor, Benovoy, Longo, Cooperstock, &
Zatorre, 2009). To identify support for the assertion that music with
a fast tempo is perceived as “happy,” we measured mood states at
two different time points (i.e., before and after each background
sound condition) using the Profile of Mood States (PoMS) question-
naire (McNair, 1971). In Experiment 3, we also acquired data relating
to participants' musical preferences (i.e., whether they liked or disliked
the presented background sound) and their study habits (i.e., whether
they tend to study with music or without background music). These
data were intended to be peripheral to the main findings, but they
nevertheless had the capacity to provide an indication of whether
the impact of mood on CRAT performance is influenced by either
musical preference or study habits.
We also note that in explaining the findings arising in Experiments 1
and 2, yet another possibility is that the promotion of creativity through
processing disfluency in the presence of background noise (Mehta et al.,
2012) is a specific effect that is limited to the presence of relatively
“steady‐state” sound, unlike the background music used in our condi-
tions, which clearly satisfied the criteria for “changing‐state” sound.
Therefore, in Experiment 3, we included a “library noise” condition,
which resembled that used by Mehta and colleagues (Mehta et al.,
2012).We contrasted this library noise conditionwith amusic condition
(i.e., popular music with familiar lyrics) and with a quiet condition.
In terms of the outcomes of Experiment 3, if the mood and arousal
account (Ritter & Ferguson, 2017; Thompson et al., 2001) is correct,
then we expected to observe an increase in CRAT performance in the
background music condition compared with the quiet and library noise
conditions, assuming that the music condition reliably increases mood
and arousal compared with the library noise condition. We note here
that studies exploring the mood and arousal effect usually present
music prior to, rather than concurrently with, the cognitive task of
interest and typically study the effects of these music stimuli on
visuo‐spatial performance such as mental rotation (Thompson et al.,
2001). However, effects of music on creative task performance that
are reportedly mediated through mood and arousal have also been
shown when music is presented concurrently with the target task in
the context of a verbally‐based creative task (Ritter & Ferguson,
2017). Moreover, participants within mood and arousal studies are free
to attend to the music, rather than instructed to ignore the background
sound, as is the case with studies of the irrelevant sound effect (Jones
& Macken, 1993). We make the assumption, however, that changes to
mood and arousal induced by the presentation of music occurs regard-
less of whether participants are free to attend the music or requested
to ignore it and explore this proposition.
The processing disfluency account (Mehta et al., 2012) would pre-
dict that both library noise and music conditions should increase CRAT
performance, whereas the modified processing disfluency account
only predicts a positive effect of background library noise on CRAT
performance. Finally, the interference‐by‐process view (e.g., Jones &
Tremblay, 2000) predicts that CRAT performance should be reduced
in the music condition relative to the library noise and quiet conditions
because the music condition comprises a changing‐state auditory
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state stimulus.FIGURE 1 Compound Remote Associate Task (CRAT) solution rates
in the three sound conditions of Experiment 3. Error bars represent
the standard error of the mean3.1 | Method
3.1.1 | Participants
Thirty‐six adults (23 female and 13 male) from the University of Cen-
tral Lancashire aged between 19 and 56 years old participated in the
experiment (M = 24 years, SD = 8.36). The participants were recruited
via an opportunity sample. Participants received course credit, or the
standard department payment rate in exchange for 30 min of partici-
pation. All participants spoke English as their first language and
reported normal (or corrected‐to‐normal) vision and hearing.
3.1.2 | Design
In relation to the assessment of CRAT performance, the design was a
3 (Sound: Quiet vs. Music vs. Library Noise) × 2 (CRAT Difficulty: Easy
vs. Difficult) × 2 (Study Habit: Music vs. No Music) mixed design. For
the purpose of mood evaluation, the following within‐participants
design was used to determine mood changes using the PoMs ques-
tionnaire: 3 (Sound: Quiet vs. Music vs. Library Noise) × 2 (Time:
Before vs. After) × 6 (Mood State: Tension vs. Depression vs. Anger
vs. Confusion vs. Fatigue vs. Vigour). The music chosen for the back-
ground sound was a popular 2013 mid‐tempo soul and neo‐soul song
that contained positive lyrics and had an upbeat melody. The library
noise consisted of distant (nonintelligible) speech, photocopier noise,
typing, and rustling of papers.
3.1.3 | Materials
Before undertaking the CRATs, participants were asked: “Do you ordi-
narily study in the presence of background music?” and responded yes
or no. The PoMS questionnaire is designed to measure fluctuating
feelings and affective states (for further details, see McNair, 1971).
The questionnaire measures six different aspects of mood state: ten-
sion, depression, anger, confusion, fatigue, and vigour. According to
instructions of administration, the six mood states can be combined
in the following way to produce a Total Mood Disturbance (TMD)
score: tension + depression + anger + confusion + fatigue − vigour.
However, for the purposes of this design, we were interested in the
specific mood profile, and therefore, the six specific profile scores
were used rather than a general TMD measure (McNair, 1971).
Using the norming data on solution rate and solution time for 30‐s
presentation time, an additional set of 19 CRAT problems (10 easy and
nine difficult) matching accuracy and solution times to Sets A and B
was selected using the program “Match” (Van Casteren & Davis,
2007) to create Set C (solution accuracy M = 47.9%, SD = 25.7, solu-
tion times: M = 9.6 s, SD = 3.3). The experiment was fully
counterbalanced such that each CRAT set appeared within each sound
condition. After undertaking the CRATs, participants were asked: “Did
you like the music?” and responded yes or no.3.2 | Results
Like Experiments 1 and 2, the dependent variable was the mean solu-
tion rate for the CRAT problems. As mentioned in the foregoing,
Experiment 3 included a number of further dependent variables.
These were responses to the PoMS questionnaires administered
before and after the completion of each set of CRATs. The PoMS con-
tains measures of six mood states: tension, depression, anger, confu-
sion, fatigue, and vigour. There was also a brief questionnaire related
to musical preference (whether participants liked the music played
during the music condition) and study habits (whether they regularly
listened to music when studying). Twenty‐nine participants responded
that they liked the music and seven responded that they disliked the
music, indicating that the vast majority of participants found the music
appealing. Furthermore, 18 participants responded that they ordinarily
studied in the presence of music, whereas 18 preferred to study with-
out the presence of music. Participants were assigned to Music vs. No
Music for Study Habit, accordingly. An alpha level of p < 0.05 was
adopted for all statistical tests used.3.2.1 | Solution rates
The descriptive data for solution rates (see Figure 1) suggested that
CRATs were more likely to be solved in the quiet and library noise
conditions, in comparison with the music condition. However, there
appeared to be no difference in the number of CRATs solved between
the quiet and library noise conditions. Easy CRATs also seemed to be
solved more readily than difficult CRATs. To examine these apparent
effects further, a 3 (Sound: Quiet vs. Music vs. Library Noise) × 2
(CRAT Difficulty: Easy vs. Difficult) × 2 (Study Habit: Music vs. No
Music) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the solution rate data. There
was a significant main effect of Sound on solution rates, F (2,
68) = 7.08, MSE = 0.07, p = 0.002, ηp
2 = 0.12. Pairwise comparisons
revealed that significantly more CRATs were solved in the Quiet con-
dition (M = 0.34, SE = 0.05) in comparison with the Music condition
(M = 0.30, SE = 0.04, p = 0.002). There were also significantly more
CRATs solved in the Library Noise condition (M = 0.37, SE = 0.04,
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was no significant difference between the mean number of CRATs
solved in the Quiet and Library Noise conditions (p = 0.70).
As expected, there was a significant main effect of CRAT difficulty
on solution rates, F (1, 34) = 218.13.75, MSE = 0.02, p < 0.001,
ηp
2 = 0.87, with significantly more easy CRATs solved (M = 0.48,
SE = 0.04) than difficult CRATs (M = 0.19, SE = 0.04). There was also
no significant main effect of Study Habit on CRAT solution times,
F (1, 32) = 0.01, MSE = 0.26, p = 0.93, ηp
2 = 0.000. Participants who
specified that they preferred to study without music (M = 0.34,
SE = 0.05) did not solve significantly more CRATs than those who
specified that they preferred to study with music (M = 0.34, SE = 0.05).
The remaining interactions and three‐way interactions all failed to
reach significance (all ps > 0.05).
3.2.2 | PoMs questionnaire
To ascertain any changes in mood before and after completing the
CRATs in each sound condition, a PoMS questionnaire was adminis-
tered to participants at two different points (before and after complet-
ing the CRATs in each of the three sound conditions). Therefore, each
participant completed the PoMS questionnaire a total of six times. A 3
(Sound: Quiet vs. Music vs. Library Noise) × 2 (Time: Before vs.
After) × 6 (Mood State: Tension vs. Depression vs. Anger vs. Confu-
sion vs. Fatigue vs. Vigour) within‐participants ANOVA was conducted
on the mood state scores. The ANOVA revealed that there was no sig-
nificant main effect of Sound, F (2, 70) = 1.66, MSE = 0.20, p = 0.20,
ηp
2 = 0.05, with no significant difference in the mean mood state score
in the Quiet (M = 5.89, SE = 0.54), Music (M = 5.65, SE = 0.58), and
Library Noise (M = 6.10, SE = 0.54) conditions. There was a main effect
of Time, F (1, 35) = 6.10, MSE = 9.98, p = 0.02, ηp
2 = 0.15, with mean
mood state scores significantly higher Before (M = 6.10, SE = 0.58) in
comparison with After (M = 5.66, SE = 0.49) completing the CRATs.
There was a significant main effect of Mood, F (5, 175) = 28.17,
MSE = 80.60, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.45. Pairwise comparisons indicated
that there were significant differences between all mood states with
the exception of tension (M = 5.05, SE = 0.67) versus fatigue
(M = 5.13, SE = 0.78), depression (M = 2.86, SE = 0.87) versus anger
(M = 5.13, SE = 0.78), anger versus fatigue, and fatigue versus vigour
(M = 11.96, SE = 0.91; all ps > 0.05). There was no significant
Sound × Time interaction, F (2, 70) = 2.43, MSE = 11.88, p = 0.10,
ηp
2 = 0.07, Sound × Mood interaction, F (10, 350) = 1.42, MSE = 8.25,
p = 0.10, ηp
2 = 0.07, or Time × Mood interaction, F (5, 175) = 0.48,
MSE = 5.18, p = 0.79, ηp
2 = 0.01.
As expected, there was a significant three‐way
Sound × Time × Mood interaction, F (10, 350) = 3.50, MSE = 5.846,
p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.09. Pairwise comparisons indicated the source of
this significant interaction. For the Quiet condition, there was no sig-
nificant change in any of the mood states after completing the
CRATs (all ps > 0.05). However, for the Music condition, there was
a significant change in mood for four out of the six mood states.
There was a significant decrease in tension (M = 5.36, SE = 0.82 vs.
M = 4.00, SE = 0.69, p = 0.01), anger (M = 4.08, SE = 1.04 vs.M = 2.72, SE = 0.69, p = 0.049), confusion (M = 6.92, SE = 0.75 vs.
M = 5.69, SE = 0.59, p = 0.02), and fatigue (M = 4.81, SE = 0.87 vs.
M = 3.72, SE = 0.80, p = 0.03). There was no significant change in
depression (M = 3.25, SE = 1.23 vs. M = 2.61, SE = 0.98, p = 0.33)
or vigour (M = 11.86, SE = 0.97 vs. M = 12.72, SE = 1.13,
p = 0.22). For the Library Noise condition, there was no significant
change in five of the six mood states (all ps > 0.05). However, there
was a significant decrease in vigour (M = 12.67, SE = 1.08 vs.
M = 10.67, SE = 0.94, p < 0.001).
These findings indicate that the significant changes in mood states
before and after completing CRATs occurred within the Music condi-
tion and not in the Quiet or Library Noise condition, thus indicating
that music altered a number of mood states, and as measured by the
PoMS, provided a general increase in positive mood. Since previous
research (Rowe et al., 2007) has shown that positive mood can
improve performance on RATs, the present observation that music
increased mood but decreased CRAT performance suggests that a
mood‐based explanation of the detrimental effect of music on creative
insight seems implausible.3.2.3 | PoMs and solution rates
In the previous section, the PoMS scores and CRAT solution rates
were examined independently. However, it is useful to consider the
possible impact of mood as a mediating influence on the relationship
between to‐be‐ignored background sound and CRAT performance.
Unfortunately, the current dataset is unsuitable for mediation analysis
(i.e., to ascertain mood as a possible direct or indirect mediator in the
relationship between background sound and CRAT performance)
given the implementation of Sound as a within‐participants factor
rather than a between‐participants factor. However, an analysis of
covariance was performed to examine CRAT solution rates when
mood score was included as a covariate. Here, we focused on the rela-
tionship between the quiet and music conditions, given our particular
interest in the disruption caused by to‐be‐ignored background music.
In order to establish the mood score for entry as a covariate, the
“before” score for each of the six mood score dimensions (tension,
depression, anger, confusion, fatigue, and vigour) was subtracted from
the “after” score to provide a “mood change” score for each of the six
profile of mood state dimensions listed above. This resulted in a mood
state dimension change score for both the music and quiet conditions,
for each mood state (tension, depression, anger, confusion, anger, and
vigour). The change score for the music condition was subtracted from
the change score for the quiet condition, to provide a single change
score for each of the six mood states. A 2 × 2 analysis of covariance
was conducted (Sound: Quiet vs. Music) × 2 (CRAT Difficulty: Easy
vs. Difficult) on solution rates, with tension, depression, anger, confu-
sion, fatigue, and vigour each entered as a covariate. The findings
revealed that all covariates failed to reach significance (all ps > 0.05),
indicating that each of the six mood state measures failed to have a
significant impact on CRAT solution rates, either directly or in interac-
tion with the Sound and CRAT Difficulty factors.
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Experiment 3 demonstrated that popular music with familiar lyrics
disrupted CRAT performance (in terms of solution rates) in compari-
son with a quiet condition or library noise condition. However, there
was no significant difference in CRAT performance between the quiet
and library noise conditions. Mehta et al. (2012) previously demon-
strated a beneficial effect to creativity with what could be termed
“steady‐state sound.” Although these findings demonstrate that a
steady‐state sound such as library noise does not result in a relative
enhancement to creativity, we also find that the decrement was not
significant, particularly in comparison with the background music with
familiar lyrics.
Furthermore, the findings imply that music with familiar lyrics
resulted in a decrement in CRAT performance, despite an apparent
overall positive increase in mood as identified by six mood states
recognised in the PoMS. Given that previous research has identified
that positive mood can lead to an improvement in RAT scores (Rowe
et al., 2007), the findings here demonstrate that the decrement in per-
formance in the music condition does not appear to be driven by
mood. Indeed, these findings further support the notion that CRAT
performance relies on verbal working memory, and that this is suscep-
tible to disruption by nonsteady‐state sound, with or without the pres-
ence of speech.TABLE 1 Bayes factors testing the effect of Music versus Quiet
conditions from Experiments 1 to 3
Effect Study
BH1/H0: Music
increases
creativity
BH2/H0: Music
decreases
creativity BH2/H1
CRAT
performance
Experiment
1
0.04 21.89 547.25
Experiment
2
0.08 11.58 144.75
Experiment
3
0.04 3.31 82.75
Note. H1 = Music > Quiet, H2 = Quiet > Music, H0 = Quiet = Music. Alter-
native hypotheses specified using a half‐normal distribution with a mode
of zero and a standard deviation of 0.17 (Mehta et al., 2012; Experiment
1). CRAT: Compound Remote Associate Task.4 | GENERAL DISCUSSION
In a series of three experiments, we investigated the impact of back-
ground music (with varying semantic properties) on creativity, as mea-
sured by performance on CRATs. In Experiment 1, background music
with foreign (and therefore “unfamiliar”) lyrics resulted in a significant
decrement to CRAT performance; significantly fewer CRATs were
solved in the music with foreign lyrics condition in comparison with
the quiet condition. This finding was replicated in Experiment 2 with
the implementation of background instrumental music in comparison
with a quiet condition. In Experiment 3, familiar music was found to
impair CRAT performance regardless of whether the music induced a
positive mood or whether those participants typically studied in the
presence of music. Moreover, disruption occurred despite the fact
that the music was liked by the participants, which coheres with the
findings of Perham and Vizard (2010) and Perham and Currie (2014),
who showed equivalent disruption by liked and disliked background
music in the context of serial recall and reading comprehension,
respectively.
Prior to discussing the implications of Experiments 1 to 3 for the
theoretical accounts entertained, we undertook a Bayesian meta‐
analysis of the collective findings. Bayes factors were calculated to
quantify the evidence for two hypotheses: the hypothesis from the
processing disfluency account (cf. Mehta et al., 2012) that CRAT per-
formance would be better in the music conditions relative to the quiet
conditions (H1), and the hypothesis from the auditory distractionaccount (Jones & Tremblay, 2000) that CRAT performance would be
better in the quiet conditions relative to the music condition (H2).
To calculate Bayes factors, one must specify the plausibility of
effect sizes given one's theory. For both H1 and H2, we model the
sort of effect size considered plausible on the results of Mehta et al.
(2012), who reported that hearing a moderate level of noise resulted
in participants solving a significantly greater proportion of RATs
(M = 0.73) than participants in the quiet control condition
(M = 0.56). These results provide an approximate effect size that could
be expected for a noise manipulation (such as music) on measures of
creativity, from 0.73 to 0.56 = 0.17. Following Dienes' (2011, 2014)
guidelines, the experimental hypotheses in the current analyses were
modelled using a half‐normal distribution with a mode of 0 and a stan-
dard deviation of 0.17. Bayes factors <0.33 are interpreted as moder-
ate evidence for the null hypothesis and Bayes factors >3 as moderate
evidence for the experimental hypotheses. Bayes factors around 1 are
conventionally considered inconclusive (Dienes, 2011, 2014). Bayes
factors were calculated using Dienes and McLatchie's (2018)
calculator (results following each experiment are reported on each
row of Table 1).
Individually, there was strong evidence across all three studies for
H0 relative to H1, indicating that playing music did not enhance crea-
tivity as measured by CRAT performance (see Table 1). In contrast,
there was moderate to strong evidence from all three studies for H2
relative to H0, suggesting that music decreased creativity to approxi-
mately the same extent one might have expected it to have increased
(again refer to Table 1).
The experiment‐level analyses were followed up with a fixed‐
effects meta‐analysis using Dienes' (2008) calculator (see Goh, Hall,
& Rosenthal, 2016, for an overview of the benefits of including inter-
nal meta‐analyses within studies). The meta‐analytic posterior distri-
bution (M = −0.06, SD = 0.01; 95% CI [−0.08, −0.03]) provides the
best estimate of the population parameter and its uncertainty in light
of all three studies. The meta‐analysis suggests that music reduces
creativity as measured using the CRAT. Bayes factors were calculated
on the meta‐analytic data to test H1 and H2 and revealed that the
overall body of evidence provided substantial support for H2, that
the presence of music diminishes rather than enhances creativity,
BH2/H1(0, 0.17) = 3.36 × 10
4, thereby supporting the interference‐by‐
12 THREADGOLD ET AL.process account (Jones & Tremblay, 2000) over the processing
disfluency account (Mehta et al., 2012).
Taken together, the findings from Experiments 1 to 3, supported
by our Bayesian meta‐analysis, contradict the popular opinion that
background music enhances creativity. Instead, they demonstrate that
background music, with or without familiar semantic content (i.e.,
lyrics), or in the absence of speech, disrupts performance on CRATs,
which represent a class of highly researched verbal problem solving
tasks that are often solved creatively through insight‐based processes.
Furthermore, the findings of Experiments 1 to 3 undermine the pro-
cessing disfluency account (Mehta et al., 2012), which predicts supe-
rior performance in the presence of moderate intensity background
noise in comparison with quiet. We note that a reprieve for the
account might be offered if one were to assume that music (at least
pleasant music) impairs creativity via inducing processing fluency
(Mehta et al., 2012, p. 796). However, it is not immediately obvious
why, on the processing disfluency account, noise and music should dif-
fer in relation to the processing fluency that they hypothetically
engender.
We contend that the deficit in CRAT performance in the presence
of background music appears altogether more consistent with the
interference‐by‐process framework (e.g., Marsh et al., 2009) than with
the processing disfluency account (Mehta et al., 2012). According to
the interference‐by‐process approach, the disruption of CRAT perfor-
mance is attributable to the changing‐state effect, which refers to the
finding that a changing sequence of sound (regardless of whether
the changes occur on a speech or nonspeech carrier), disrupts serial
recall to a far greater extent than a nonchanging or steady‐state sound
(e.g., a repeated token or tone; Jones & Macken, 1993; Jones et al.,
1992). The pre‐attentive perception of changes between elements in
the sound, as a by‐product of acoustic‐based perceptual organisation
processes (Bregman, 1990), gives rise to irrelevant order cues. These
cues compete with the process responsible for subvocally maintaining
the to‐be‐remembered items in sequence. In support of this sugges-
tion, we have recently found that changing‐state letters (c, t, g, u) pro-
duce more disruption to CRAT performance than steady‐state letters
(c, c, c, c; Marsh, Threadgold, Barker, & Ball, 2017). Music, of course,
is a changing‐state, rather than a steady‐state, sound. Therefore, the
findings presented here, which attest to the disruption to verbal
insight problem solving as measured through CRAT performance, are
entirely consistent with findings that have revealed a disruption to
serial recall by changing‐state sounds that include music (e.g., Perham
& Vizard, 2010). Furthermore, the findings imply that the presence or
absence of semantic content (i.e., lyrics)—and indeed the familiarity of
the lyrics (e.g., lyrics in foreign and unfamiliar language)—does not alter
the disruptive influence of background music. Moreover, that back-
ground music successfully increased mood and arousal in Experiment
3, but led to poorer, rather than better, CRAT performance compared
with the quiet control and library noise condition undermines the
mood and arousal account (Ritter & Ferguson, 2017; Schellenberg
et al., 2007).
One explanation for why background music impairs CRAT perfor-
mance in the same way as it impairs serial recall (e.g., Salamé &Baddeley, 1989) relates to the processes of verbal working memory
and their importance for insight problem solving. Indeed, Ball and Ste-
vens (2009) identified a strong verbal component to the solving of
insight‐based CRATs, in that implementing a “think aloud” process
during problem solving reliably enhanced solution rates. If verbal
working memory is important for CRAT performance, and any
nonsteady‐state background sound (such as music) is disruptive to
the creative and analytic processes necessary to solve CRATs, a decre-
ment to CRAT performance would be expected. This, therefore, sug-
gests that it is not the type of semantic content within the to‐be‐
ignored background per se that is disruptive to insight problem solv-
ing, but rather the presence of changing‐state sound and its impact
on verbal working memory processes (such as rehearsal) underpinning
the solving of CRATs. It might be, for example, that participants
rehearse various target solutions, before obtaining an appropriate
solution word. For example, for the problem “house,” “pear,” and “fam-
ily,” it might be the case that “tree‐house” and “pear‐tree” are
rehearsed, whereas participants test out the viability of another gener-
ated word, including the solution, “family‐tree.” That solution words
can either serve as a prefix or a suffix to problem words may reinforce
the rehearsal strategy because order processing is necessary to obtain
an appropriate solution (“tree‐pear” being an appropriate combination
of the problem and solution word but in the reverse order). However,
because semantic associative processes are likely to be involved in
CRAT solving (Smith et al., 2013), it would be reasonable to predict
that meaningful background speech in a participant's mother tongue,
as compared with meaningless background speech (speech in a lan-
guage foreign to the participant), could produce additional disruption
to CRAT solving, superimposed on the changing‐state effect, as a con-
sequence of a semantic interference‐by‐process. The general notion is
that disruption over and above the changing‐state effect can occur
when there is a conflict between semantic processing of the sound
and semantic processing in the focal task (Jones et al., 2012; Marsh
et al., 2009). For example, in the context of mental arithmetic, Perham,
Marsh, Clarkson, Lawrence, and Sörqvist (2016) argued that the addi-
tional disruption due to an ascending sequence of number distracters
as compared with a random sequence was produced due to an addi-
tional priming process that was superimposed upon the interference‐
by‐process that underpinned the changing‐state effect.
One challenge that stems from the finding that background music
impairs CRAT solving relates to determining the generalisability of the
observed effect beyond CRATs alone. CRATs are but one example of
a verbal insight problem solving task, albeit a popular and widely used
example that is believed to provide an effective test of creativity (e.g.,
Bowden & Jung‐Beeman, 1998; Mednick, 1962). However, many other
types of verbal and non‐verbal insight problem solving tasks exist (e.g.,
see Gilhooly, Fioratou, & Henretty, 2010). An important consideration
is to what extent do the explanations presented here in terms of
interference‐by‐process and working memory generalise to further
insight problem solving tasks in both the verbal and visual domain?
In relation to this latter question, preliminary evidence from Ball,
Marsh, Litchfield, Cook, and Booth (2015) suggests that non‐verbal
(i.e., visuo‐spatial) insight problem solving may in fact be facilitated,
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sic” non‐verbal insight problems (such as the pigs‐in‐pens problem; see
Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993) more accurately, and faster, when
background sound was presented (in a form that involved repeated,
canonical counting of the digit sequence 1 to 7) compared with a quiet
background. According to Ball et al. (2015), these results can be
interpreted in terms of background sound impairing inner speech,
thereby permitting the operation of nonreportable, “special processes”
(e.g., problem restructuring) that are critical for enabling successful
solutions to emerge in classic insight‐based problem solving tasks
involving predominantly visuo‐spatial components. It is our conjecture
that background music would have a similar positive effect to this, yet
it would be the changing‐state properties of the to‐be‐ignored back-
ground music, rather than the music per se, that would underpin an
apparent enhancement in creativity. In sum, boundary effects are
likely to be evident in terms of the following: (a) the relationship
between background music and creativity; (b) the negative conse-
quences of background music on verbal insight problem solving tasks
as demonstrated here with CRATs; and (c) the positive consequences
on visuo‐spatial insight problem solving tasks (e.g., Ball et al., 2015).
One further point of consideration is thatMehta et al. (2012) found
facilitatory effects of background sound for a number of different tasks
that are thought to tap creativity. Although we found no evidence for
the processing disfluency account (Mehta et al., 2012) in the context
of our current study, it is possible that other tasks, or their component
processes, are more sensitive to the potential engendering of process-
ing disfluency—and thus enhancement of cognition—via the presence
of background noise. Arriving at a CRAT solution may involve multiple
processes that include a delicate balance between top‐down processes
(e.g., rehearsal and executive control, such as inhibition in the case of
excluding incorrect response candidates) and bottom‐up processes,
such as spreading activation in associative, semantic networks that pro-
vide the candidate responses (cf. Benedek et al., 2016). Because it is
likely that the balance between these top‐down and bottom‐up pro-
cesses may differ substantially between different insight problems, dif-
ferent susceptibility to distraction by background sound is likely across
different types of problem solving tasks solved via a process of insight.
In this way, it is possible that any advantage to creative problem solving
promoted by processing disfluency due to the presence of background
noise may be dependent upon the particular strategy and processes
used to solve a CRAT. It is reasonable to suggest that such strategies
and processes could differ on a problem‐by‐problem basis.
Although we argue that our results can be explained in terms of
the interference‐by‐process account (Jones & Tremblay, 2000), it is
important to note that there are two competing explanations for a
deficit in CRAT performance with background noise, which both stem
from well‐established theories of creativity. One such explanation
derives from the “broad attentional scope” (BAS) view of creativity
(Zabelina, O'Leary, Pornpattananangkul, Nusslock, & Beaman, 2015),
whereas the other derives from the “focused attentional scope”
(FAS) perspective (Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, & Wynn, 2007). The
BAS view supposes that background sound may reduce the overall
amount of attention that one can apply to the problem solving task,resulting in a diffuse attentional state that can facilitate insight problem
solving (Jarosz, Colflesh, & Wiley, 2012). In comparison, the FAS view
proposes that if background sound reduces overall attention, then
insight problem solving will be impaired. This FAS view is consistent
with theories of distraction that assume the presence of background
sound captures attention away from the focal task (Cowan, 1995) or
reduces the overall amount of attention applied to the focal task
(Neath, 2000), thus impairing observed performance. Across three
experiments, we demonstrate a deficit to CRAT performance with dis-
traction via to‐be‐ignored background music. Such a deficit to creativ-
ity is consistent with the importance of FAS in verbal insight problem
solving such as with CRATs.
One might assume that the findings reported here suggest that a
disruption to FAS is generated by to‐be‐ignored background music,
and that this is disruptive to the analytic and associative processes nec-
essary to solve insight problems. However, there are two key problems
with this assumption. First, there was nothing inherent within the pre-
sented background sound that was likely to capture attention and thus
disrupt the attention directed towards the task at hand. Moreover, the
notion that the overall amount of attention that could be applied to the
focal task is reduced in the presence of background sound is inconsis-
tent with the literature showing that only tasks that require verbal
rehearsal are susceptible to distraction (Beaman & Jones, 1997; Jones
& Macken, 1993). Second, if background sound impaired a focused
attentional state necessary to solve insight problem solving tasks, then
one would expect disruption, not facilitation, on tasks that require
visuo‐spatial insight problem solving, similar to that found with verbal
insight problem solving. However, evidence from Ball et al. (2015) and
the findings presented here suggest a dissociation in the facilitatory
and disruptive effects of to‐be‐ignored background sound on verbal
and visuo‐spatial insight problems, respectively.
To conclude, the findings here challenge the popular view that
music enhances creativity, and instead demonstrate that music,
regardless of the presence of semantic content (no lyrics, familiar
lyrics, or unfamiliar lyrics), consistently disrupts creative performance
in insight problem solving as measured by CRATs.
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